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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, 
as amended). 
Statement of Issues 
I. Whether statements made by the prosecutor in opening 
statement amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. The test for 
determining whether a case should be reversed is if the remarks of 
counsel call attention of the jurors to matters which they should 
not consider and whether the jurors were influenced by the remarks 
or the defendant was prejudiced. State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (Utah 1973). 
Case No. 920477 
Priority 2 
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II. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
convict the defendant of battery. The standard of review is set 
out in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), where the review 
of the evidence is in the light most favorable to the jury verdict 
and reversing only when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime". Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. 
Determinative Provisions or Statutes 
The determinative statute for this case is Section 11.08.020 
of the Salt Lake City Code, which statute is set out fully in the 
Addendum attached hereto. 
Statement of Case 
Defendant/Appellant Paul Woolley (hereinafter referred to as 
defendant) was charged by way of Information with Battery, a Class 
B misdemeanor, which occurred on February 3, 1992, in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The case was tried before a jury on June 22, 1992, 
with the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding. The jury found 
defendant guilty of the offense and he was sentenced. 
Statement of Facts 
Appellee concurs with defendant's Statement of Facts with the 
following additions. 
During the opening statement at trial, counsel for appellee 
introduced herself, stating that she was an assistant City 
Prosecutor for Salt Lake City and that she represented the 
government. She continued, stating "Somewhere along the line today 
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I want you to stop and think about what government means to you. 
Particularly in a case like this. The government represents you, 
it represents'1. At that point an objection was made, leaving the 
sentence uncompleted. The objection was sustained and counsel 
continued with "I work for Salt Lake City. Because I represent 
Salt Lake City I have no one to sit next to me at counsel table. 
That is why I will be alone at counsel table and you need to 
realize that that's my job here today" (T. 3). 
During defense counsel's opening statement, she admonished the 
jury to keep in mind that "the only evidence you need to consider 
is evidence that comes from people that sit in that witness chair 
or evidence that the judge enters in such as documents or things of 
that nature. What I or what Ms. Atkin say to you is not testimony" 
(T. 5). 
Sammy Knighton, the witness who was with the victim at the 
time of the incident, stated that the victim was hit and knocked 
down, receiving a bruise (T. 8). He further described it as a hit 
in the jaw with a fist, causing the jaw to become swollen (T. 9, 
10, 33). He said the person came from behind them but that he 
could not remember to which side of him the victim was (T. p. 10, 
12, 33). On cross-examination, the witness stated that the victim 
was on his left side, but that the incident happened fast and he 
could not remember everything (T. 12, 13). However, Mr. Knighton 
positively identified the defendant as the person who hit the 
victim (T. 9, 10, 31). 
3 
Albert Ortega, the step-brother of the victim, told the jury 
that his step sister is handicapped with a "slow mental 
disability", for which she receives training at the Columbus 
Community Center (T. 14). This witness did not see the incident 
but ran from the house and saw defendant (T. 15). Mr. Ortega also 
positively identified defendant (T. 16). 
Juanita Valdez, the victim, testified that she was hit in 
the jaw by the defendant (T. 21, 22). 
At the close of trial, the Judge instructed the jury 
extensively, telling them to only base their considerations on 
evidence from witnesses or exhibits or inferences drawn from proven 
facts. The jury was instructed to not consider statements of 
counsel as evidence (R. 20; Instruction No. 6 set out fully in 
Addendum). In addition, an instruction was given listing the 
factors the jury could consider in determining credibility of the 
witnesses, which included their demeanor, their capacity to 
perceive, recollect and communicate, their opportunity to perceive, 
etc. (R. 28-29; Instruction No. 14 set out fully in Addendum). The 
jury was also instructed to not base any verdict on mere 
possibility, surmise or speculation (R. 31; Instruction No. 16 set 
out fully in Addendum). 
Summary of Argument 
The remarks of the prosecutor in opening argument at trial of 
this case did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct as they did 
not call the attention of the jurors to evidence they should not 
consider nor did they prejudice defendant's case. The remarks were 
4 
immediately objected to by defense counsel and Instructions given 
by the Court mitigated any error that might have occurred. 
There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of 
battery through the testimony of the witnesses, even though 
portions of their testimony were inconsistent. The jury was in the 
best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and their 
determination resulted in defendant's conviction. 
Argument 
POINT I. 
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR IN OPENING STATEMENT 
DID NOT AMOUNT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
The opening statements in a jury trial are an important method 
of providing the jury with an overview of the case and the people 
involved in the trial. The statements begin to guide the jury 
through the entire trial process so they will more fully understand 
their part and their ultimate responsibility. 
The Utah courts have adopted a two-prong standard for 
prosecutorial misconduct. For a case to be reversed, the remarks 
must "call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and 
were they, under the circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks". State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(Utah 1973). This test has been extensively applied in subsequent 
cases. 
In the case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), the 
Supreme Court applied the Valdez test after the prosecutor told a 
jury that defendant was using an alias, was in a federal witness 
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program, that he had been involved in "various criminal matters" 
and compared him to known criminals with irrational behavior. The 
Court found that both prongs of the test were met and defendant's 
conviction was reversed. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, 487. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction under the two-prong 
test in State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1989), after a 
prosecutor referred to a defendant's previous felony convictions. 
Counsel for defendant originally elicited the testimony on direct 
examination of the defendant. The prosecutor then cross-examined 
on the issue and used it in closing argument. This Court found 
that any possible prejudice caused by the comments were mitigated 
by a court instruction stating that prior convictions could be used 
only in weighing credibility and that any prejudicial error was 
harmless. Ortiz, 782 P.2d at 962. 
In the case of State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), the 
prosecutor in closing argument commented on lack of consent of the 
victim in the aggravated sexual assault case, incorrectly stating 
the law that v/as provided to the jury in an instruction. In 
addition, he stated that he was impressed by the evidence in the 
case. The Court relied on reasoning in United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (1985): 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of 
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion concerning 
the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such comments 
can convey the impression that evidence not presented to 
the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the 
charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the 
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the 
evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's 
opinion carried with it the imprimatur of the Government 
and may induce the jury to trust the Government's 
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judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. 
Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19. 
That Court continued: 
(A) criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned 
on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, 
for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; 
only by so doing can it be determined whether the 
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. 
Young, 470 U.S. at 7. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court found the prosecutor's comments to 
be harmless based on other comments made during the course of 
trial, thereby affirming defendant's conviction. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 
at 480. 
In reviewing a prosecutor's misstatement of the law to the 
jury on a crucial defense issue in State v. Lopez, 789 P. 2d 39 
(Utah App. 1990), this Court found that the attention of the jurors 
was drawn to something they should not have considered. However, 
because defense counsel immediately objected to the comment and in 
detail corrected the error in her closing argument, the Court found 
the prosecutor's remarks were not reversible error. Lopez, 789 
P.2d at 45. The Court continued to evaluate the effect of the 
remark on the jury and considered the strength of the evidence, 
pointing out that there was "overwhelming" evidence of defendant's 
guilt balanced against defendant's "improbable, contradictory, and 
self-serving accounts of his actions". The Court found that the 
jury "simply chose not to believe defendant's theory" and held the 
prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial. Lopez, 789 P.2d at 46. 
In a recent case, State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), 
the Supreme Court again used the two-prong test when a prosecutor 
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referred to defendant's previous convictions for forgery in closing 
argument. Although defense counsel did not object, the Court found 
the remarks were plain error in that they impacted the defendant's 
credibility and character, "which were at the heart of his 
defense". The Court concluded it was a significant error and 
warranted a new trial. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786. 
Another recent case, State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
(Utah 1992), discusses prosecutor misconduct where a prosecutor 
stated, "There isn't one of us here who knows how we would react in 
a situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on 
someone." Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. The Court stated that 
"mad dog" is a personal invective which reflected a lack of 
detachment and should not be part of a prosecutor's rhetoric. The 
Court explained: 
Prosecutors engage in misconduct, however, when they 
assert personal knowledge of the facts in issue or 
express personal opinion in the form of unsworn testimony 
that tends to "exploit the influence of the prosecutor's 
office and undermine the objective detachment that should 
separate a lawyer from the cause being argued. Brown, 201 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9; citations omitted. 
The prosecutor's remarks in this case were simply to assist 
the jury in understanding the role of the prosecutor in the trial 
process. When the government is a party in a lawsuit, jurors need 
to understand the role the government is taking in that lawsuit and 
that the prosecutor is acting on behalf of the people and society 
in general. The jurors were asked to reflect on what government 
meant to them but such reflection could elicit adverse attitudes as 
well as favorable ones. Defense counsel's objection was immediate, 
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cutting off the remainder of the prosecutor's sentence. As a 
result, the jury probably did not comprehend what the prosecutor 
was attempting to convey. 
In her opening statement, defense counsel cautioned the jury 
to only consider evidence from the witness stand or physical 
evidence admitted by the Court (T. 5). The Court also instructed 
the jury that they were only to consider the evidence of the 
witnesses and that they could not base their verdict on 
speculation, surmise or possibility (R. 20, 31), thus mitigating 
any possible effect the comments may have had on the jury. There 
was no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the case, rendering it harmless error. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
In reviewing the cases of prosecutor misconduct that have 
resulted in reversals of convictions, the misconduct was egregious. 
In this case the prosecutor did not call attention to prior 
convictions of defendant, did not misstate the law, did not comment 
on the strength of the evidence or refer to defendant as a "mad 
dog". Additional evidence was not brought into the trial to 
support the charges and the remarks did not indicate any 
trustworthiness of the City's case. At no time was the influence 
of the prosecutor's office exploited nor was defendant's 
credibility or character undermined. The two-prong test set forth 
in State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426, has not been met in this case. 
The jurors' attention was not called to something they should not 
have considered and their decision was not influenced by the 
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remark. If any error was made, it was harmless and did not result 
in any prejudice to defendant as it was properly mitigated by 
defense counsel and the Court in its instructions. The jury judged 
the credibility of the witnesses, including defendant, and found 
him guilty of Battery. His conviction did not result from 
prejudice but from the evidence presented and relied upon by the 
jury. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF 
BATTERY. 
The offense of Battery under Salt Lake City Code, Section 
11.08.020, as set out in the Addendum attached hereto, includes 
willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another. Although they were mentally handicapped and could not 
remember all details and were inconsistent on some of the details, 
the two witnesses for the prosecution, Mr. Knighton and Ms. Valdez, 
were certain that Ms. Valdez was hit by the defendant. The hit 
knocked her to the ground, causing bruising and swelling in the jaw 
area. In addition, Mr. Ortega confirmed that the defendant was in 
the area. 
The Utah Courts have addressed the issue of sufficiency of the 
evidence on numerous occasions holding: 
In reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether it was 
based on sufficient evidence, we view the evidence 
presented and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. (Citations omitted) 
The jury, not the appellate court, should weigh the 
evidence and assess witness credibility. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). Thus, we will 
sustain the jury's verdict where there is any evidence or 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence 
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from which the jury could make findings of all the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State 
v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 9 (Utah 1992). See also 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court continued: 
It lies within the province of the jury to determine the 
facts, and this Court does not have the prerogative to 
substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses 
for that of the fact-finder. When faced with a challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court, then, must 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict and will overturn the verdict only when the 
evidence is so lacking or insubstantial that a reasonable 
person could not have reached that verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 
(Utah 1989) . 
In the case of State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992) 
there was extensive inconsistent testimony among seven girls who 
had been supplied alcohol by defendant at his home. Some of the 
girls said defendant was at the home all night, others said he was 
not there for part of the evening. Some of the girls were offered 
beer by defendant, others took the beer from the refrigerator 
without objection by defendant. All but one of the girls signed a 
statement recanting their testimony to the police and their 
testimony at the preliminary hearing. The jury found the defendant 
guilty and the verdict was upheld despite the contradictory and 
inconsistent testimony. Vigil, 840 P.2d at 793. 
In the case presently before the Court, there was inconsistent 
testimony from the witnesses as to which side of Mr. Knighton Ms. 
Valdez was on and which side of her face was hit. The jury 
witnessed the mental handicaps of the witnesses and judged their 
credibility. This Court should not substitute its judgment for 
that of the jury particularly in this case because of the handicaps 
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of the witnesses. They were "slow" but were functioning adults and 
capable of knowing the basic facts of what occurred. The jury was 
instructed on factors to consider in judging credibility (R. 28-29) 
and they made a determination of that credibility. The jury found 
the important facts beyond a reasonable doubt: that defendant hit 
the victim. There was sufficient credible evidence to support the 
conviction of defendant. The evidence was not so lacking or 
insubstantial that it was unreasonable for the jury to reach its 
verdict. The jury simply believed the prosecution witnesses and 
rejected the testimony of defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The remarks of the prosecutor in this case did not amount to 
prosecutorial misconduct or were minimal, harmless error. 
Sufficient evidence is provided in the record to uphold defendant's 
conviction of Battery. Appellee respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the jury. 
Dated this cP? day of L=Jas*-*t<i*^f 1993. 
cu ^ ^ T ^ f c c 
Marsbar-^ S. Atkin 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Mr. Carlos A. Esqueda, Salt 
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11.08.050 Place of commission of offense 
involving use of telephone. 
11.08.010 Assault 
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled 
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another: It is unlawful for any 
person to commit an assault within the limits of 
Salt Lake City. (Prior code § 32-1-2) 
11.08.020 Battery. 
A battery is any wilful and unlawful use of 
force or violence upon the person of another. It is 
unlawful for any person to commit a battery 
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3) 
11.08.030 Telephone harassment. 
A. A person is guilty of telephone harassment 
if, with intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful 
communication, including but not limited to 
making a call or calls and then terminating the 
call before conversation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls 
at extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use 
of telephone communication in a manner likely 
to provoke a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes 
any false statement concerninginjury, death, dis-
figurement, indecent conduct or criminal con-
duct of the person telephoned or any member of 
his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or 
threatening language with intent to terrify, 
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a 
false statement as herein set out shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, 
harass or annoy. 
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B misde-
meanor; (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
§ 32-1-19) 
11.08.040 Emergency telephone abuse. 
A* A person is guilty of emergency telephone 
abuse if such person: 
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender 
the use of a party line or a public pay telephone to 
another person upon being informed that such 
telephone is needed to report a fire or summon 
police, medical or other aid in case of emergency, 
unless such telephone is likewise being used for 
an emergency call; or 
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line or 
a public pay telephone on the pretext that an 
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency 
exists. 
B. Emergency telephone abuse is a Gass B 
misdemeanor. 
C For the purposes of subsection A of this 
section: 
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which 
property or human life is in jeopardy and the 
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the 
preservation of human life or property; 
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or 
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main 
telephone stations connected therewith, each sta-
tion with a distinctive ring or telephone number. 
(Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 
32-N20) 
11.08.050 Place of commission of offense 
involving use of telephone. 
Any offense committed by use of a telephone 
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or 
their successors, may be deemed to have been 
committed at either the place at which the tele-
phone call or calls were made, or at the place 
where the telephone call or calls were received. 
(Ord, 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 
32-1-22) 
Chapter 11J2 





As jurors, it is your exclusive responsibility to determine 
the issues of fact in this case and you are to decide those issues 
from the evidence received in the trial and not from speculation or 
conjecture. 
The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony 
of witnesses, exhibits received by the court, stipulations of the 
parties, reasonable inferences to be drawn from facts proven in the 
case, presumptions, if any, as are stated in these instructions, and 
all of the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. Statements of 
counsel are not evidence and should not be considered as such by you. 
If and where there is a conflict in the evidence, you 
should reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can; but 
where the conflict cannot be reconciled then, since you are the 
final judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, you 
must resolve that conflict and determine from the evidence what you 
believe the true facts to be. 
^ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You 
are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses who have testified in this case. In determining the 
credibility of a witness you may consider any matter that has a 
tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his/her 
testimony, including but not limited to the following: 
His/her demeanor while testifying and the manner in which 
he/she testified; 
The character of his/her testimony; 
The extent of his/her capacity to perceive, to recollect, 
or to communicate any matter about which he/she testifies; 
The extent of his/her opportunity to perceive any matter 
about which he/she testifies; 
His/her character for honesty or veracity or their 
opposites; 
The existence of honesty or veracity or their opposites; 
The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other 
motive; 
A statement previously made by him/her that is consistent 
with his/her testimony; 
A statement made by him/her that is inconsistent with any 
part of his/her testimony; 
The existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by 
him/her; 
¥• 
His/her attitude toward the action in which he/she 
testifies or toward the giving of testimony; or 
His/her admission of untruthfulness. 
His/her prior conviction of a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You cannot convict the defendant on mere possibilities, 
surmises, or speculations, however strong they may be. A verdict of 
guilty based upon mere possibilities or surmises would violate the 
oath that you jurors have taken. Nor does the law permit you to 
guess or speculate as to the activities of the defendant. 
& 
